The Future of Youth Justice: A Community-Based Alternative to the Youth Prison Model by Miriam Shark et al.
New Thinking in Community Corrections
VE RI TAS HARVARD Kennedy School
Program in Criminal Justice
Policy and Management
Executive Session on  
Community Corrections
This is one in a series of papers that will be 
published as a result of the Executive Session on 
Community Corrections. 
The Executive Sessions at Harvard Kennedy 
School bring together individuals of independent 
standing who take joint responsibility for 
rethinking and improving society’s responses to 
an issue. Members are selected based on their 
experiences, their reputation for thoughtfulness, 
and their potential for helping to disseminate the 
work of the Session. 
Members of the Executive Session on Community 
Corrections have come together with the aim of 
developing a new paradigm for correctional policy 
at a historic time for criminal justice reform. The 
Executive Session works to explore the role of 
community corrections and communities in the 
interest of justice and public safety. 
Learn more about the Executive Session on 
Community Corrections at: 
NIJ’s website: www.NIJ.gov, keywords “Executive 
Session Community Corrections”
Harvard’s website: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/
criminaljustice/communitycorrections
The Future of Youth Justice: A Community-Based Alternative to the  
Youth Prison Model 
Patrick McCarthy, Vincent Schiraldi, and Miriam Shark
Introduction
[F]airly viewed, pretrial detention of a juvenile 
gives rise to injuries comparable to those associated 
with the imprisonment of an adult. 
—Justice Thurgood Marshall
It is, in all but name, a penitentiary. 
—Justice Hugo L. Black
Is America getting what it wants and needs by 
incarcerating in youth prisons young people who 
get in trouble with the law?  
If not, is there a better way? 
For 170 years, since our first youth correctional 
institution opened, America’s approach to youth 
incarceration has been built on the premise that a 
slightly modified version of the adult correctional 
model of incarceration, control, coercion, and 
punishment — with a little bit of programming 
sprinkled in — would rehabilitate young people. 
Sometimes the names attempt to camouflage the 
nature of the facility, but whether they are called 
“training schools” or “youth centers,” nearly all of 
these facilities are youth prisons.1 
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Whether the benefits and costs of youth prisons are 
weighed on a scale of public dollars, community 
safety, or young people’s futures, they are damaging 
the very people they are supposed to help and have 
been for generations. It is difficult to find an area of 
U.S. policy where the benefits and costs are more 
out of balance, where the evidence of failure is 
clearer, or where we know with more clarity what 
we should be doing differently.  
This ill-conceived and outmoded approach is a 
failure, with high costs and recidivism rates and 
institutional conditions that are often appalling. Our 
approach to youth in trouble with the law requires 
a watershed change to one that is more effective, 
more informed by evidence of what works, more 
likely to protect public safety, more developmentally 
appropriate, more humane, and more community 
based. Every youth prison in the country should be 
closed and replaced with a network of community-
based programs and small facilities near the youth’s 
communities. Closing these failed institutions 
requires a clear-headed, common-sense, bipartisan 
policy approach, and a commitment to replace these 
facilities with effective alternatives that are already 
available.
History
Around 170 years ago, with the opening of 
Massachusetts’ Lyman School for Boys in 1846 (Miller, 
1991), American reformers began experimenting with a 
“new” approach to troubled youth (Schiraldi, Schindler, 
and Goliday, 2011). As the social and economic forces 
of the time brought more rural and immigrant families 
into America’s urban environments, philanthropists 
and child advocates of the 1800s struggled to resolve 
what they saw as rising misbehavior by the young, 
urban poor (Krisberg and Austin, 1993).  
In a departure from the primacy of the family as the 
principal foundation of social control, reformers of 
the time turned to a new and untested institution — 
the reformatory. Viewed alternately as a humane 
response to poorhouses and prisons or as a means 
to control and punish unruly immigrant youth, 
“reform schools” became increasingly popular as 
a government response to what was perceived as 
a rising threat from ungovernable urban juveniles 
(Siegel and Senna, 1985). This struggle between the 
humanistic and punitive instincts of the youth justice 
system and its facilities is evident to the present day, 
and was woven into its very creation (Platt, 1977; Butts 
and Mitchell, 2000).
Reliance on these large, congregate facilities has 
resulted in scandalous abuses, unconstitutional 
conditions, and poor public safety outcomes almost 
since their inception, sometimes despite yeoman 
efforts to improve them. Although they were founded 
with great fanfare to remove wayward youth from city 
streets and reform them in rural environments, the 
facilities quickly revealed many of the ills that plague 
them to this day. Cruelly regimented schedules were 
enforced by whippings and isolation. Youth were 
leased out to sometimes harsh working conditions, 
leading to accusations of profiteering and concerns 
that cheap inmate labor was depressing wages. 
Although nominally dedicated to helping turn 
young people’s lives around, many facilities were 
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merely warehouses, with scant differences from their 
adult cousin — the penitentiary (Rothman, 1980). 
Furthermore, the majority of youth confined in these 
19th-century institutions were incarcerated not for 
law violations, but for status offenses such as running 
away from home and ungovernability.  
Ironically, the zeal of Progressive Era reformers 
in the early 1900s may have served to justify and 
increase the use of institutions, renamed “reform 
schools” by Progressives to paint on them a more 
professionalized and hopeful veneer. After the 
founding of the first separate court for juveniles in 
Chicago in 1899, besieged wardens found solace in 
the court’s rehabilitative ethos as a defense for their 
beleaguered institutions, and admission rates rose in 
the aftermath of the new court’s inception (Rothman, 
1980).  
Despite their problems, youth prisons and the less 
formal court environments endured side by side 
without significant changes until the 1960s. That is 
when concern that youth were neither being helped 
to get back on track nor provided due process 
protections led to a raft of landmark decisions by 
the U.S. Supreme Court granting youth, for example, 
the rights to counsel, to confront witnesses, and to 
be “adjudicated delinquent” (the juvenile system’s 
euphemism for “convicted”) with proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Concerned that the rehabilitative 
ethic of the court was a poor excuse to deny due 
process to youth accused of crimes, the court wrote 
that juveniles in family court got the “worst of both 
worlds” — “neither the protection accorded to adults 
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment 
postulated for children.”
Responses to the drug epidemic of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, along with a spike in violent youth 
crime, ushered in an era of even more stringent 
approaches to youth incarceration. Public fear was 
stoked by media coverage and by “tough-on-crime” 
stances taken by many public officials. Social 
scientists such as James A. Fox, John DiIulio, and 
others promulgated doomsday scenarios. In 1995, 
for example, Fox predicted a “bloodbath in about 10 
years.” 2 In 1996, DiIulio predicted that there would 
be “270,000 more young predators on the streets” 
(DiIulio, 1996). Pronouncements like these were 
wrapped in racialized, demonizing language that 
further inflamed public alarm. “The black kids who 
inspire the fear seem not merely unrecognizable but 
alien,” wrote DiIulio (1996), calling young people 
who came into contact with the justice system 
“radically impulsive, brutally remorseless” (Bennett, 
DiIulio, and Walters, 1996). The most memorable and 
damaging description was “superpredator” (DiIulio, 
1995).  
Neither Fox nor DiIulio noted that violent youth crime 
had actually begun to decline a few years earlier. It 
has been plummeting ever since. Violent crime 
arrests of youth dropped by 68 percent between 1994 
and 2014, and youth homicides, which peaked in 1993, 
have declined by 83 percent since then.  
Although Fox and DiIulio have since acknowledged 
that their predictions were based on faulty analyses 
and recanted, the damage was done. The public was 
encouraged to see young people not as individuals 
who had gotten off track and needed help but as scary, 
dehumanized predators from whom they needed to 
be protected at all costs. Policymakers responded to 
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DiIulio’s exhortation that we “will need to incarcerate 
at least 150,000 juvenile criminals in the years ahead” 
(DiIulio, 1995), resulting in record numbers of young 
people confined in adult-style prisons and giving 
rise to a wave of youth prison construction. For 
example, at the heart of the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 was a program 
that provided billions in federal funds for states to 
build or renovate prisons. With this funding, more 
than half of the states built, expanded, or renovated 
youth prisons and detention facilities, and contracted 
for additional detention and correctional beds. For 
example, California spent $250 million of those funds 
to build nearly 3,500 beds in 38 counties (Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, 2012). The number of youth in 
juvenile prisons peaked in 1999 at 109,000.
Even though youth crime and youth incarceration 
have been steadily declining since the mid-1990s, we 
are left with the legacy of this era in the form of deeply 
ingrained images of young offenders as thugs, policies 
that still over-rely on incarceration, and youth prisons 
that stubbornly resist closure efforts, maintaining 
hundreds of empty beds waiting to be filled.  
Inherently Flawed Model
The failure of youth prisons to help young people get 
back on track, as well as their failure to protect public 
safety, flows from inherent flaws in the model itself. 
Adult-style prisons that emphasize confinement 
and control are devoid of the essentials required 
for healthy adolescent development — engaged 
adults focused on their development, a peer group 
that models prosocial behavior, opportunities for 
academic success, and activities that contribute to 
developing decision-making and critical thinking 
skills (Bonnie et al., 2013). At the same time, these 
facilities provide too many of the elements that 
exacerbate the trauma that most confined youth have 
already experienced and reinforce poor choices and 
impulsive behavior. Maltreatment is endemic and 
widespread. 
We have 100 boys sleeping in one room 40 by 80 feet, 
low ceiling, and the beds are ‘two story’; there are no 
bathroom privileges of any kind in the building…. Can 
we not prevail upon this assembly to give us relief? In 
the name of humanity! 
—Superintendent, St. Louis House of Refuge, 1893 
(Abrams, 2004)
It is not surprising that an incarceration-based 
approach is so ill-suited to its task when the mismatch 
between the intervention and the population is 
considered. Youth prisons contravene everything 
we know about adolescent development in general, 
and especially the population of youth who come 
into contact with the system. Instead of helping kids 
get back on track, these facilities exacerbate many of 
the factors that brought them to the attention of the 
courts in the first place.  
I recall vividly my first visit to a youth prison many years 
ago. More than a hundred teenagers in a building built for 
40. Bright, glaring lights everywhere. A constant barrage 
of noise, reverberating off hard surfaces. Kids in sweats, 
many with holes. Kids in shackles and handcuffs. Mace 
on the belts of the uniformed guards. A row of isolation 
rooms, every one with the face of a young boy in solitary 
confinement, staring out of a narrow window. The air 
dripping with pervasive stress, fear, anger and tension 
and a sense of imminent violence.
Patrick McCarthy, Keynote Speech to the National 
Juvenile Defender Leadership Summit, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, October 23, 2015
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Brain science, developmental psychology, and 
human experience underscore what developing 
youth in the catchment age of the juvenile justice 
system3 need to become mature, successful adults. 
Adolescents differ from adults in important ways 
that make adult-model incarceration ill-matched to 
their needs. Adolescents have less capacity for self-
regulation in emotionally charged situations; their 
sensitivity to environmental influences is heightened 
and they have not yet learned to make decisions with 
a future orientation (Bonnie et al., 2013). 
In a series of decisions concluding that youth should 
not be eligible for the death penalty and limiting life 
without parole sentences for youth, the U.S. Supreme 
Court elevated the new science on youth development 
as never before. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
127 S.Ct. 1183 (2005), the Court wrote that youth 
have a “‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility,” leading to recklessness, 
impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. In Miller v. 
Alabama, No. 10-9646, 567 U.S. (2012), the Court 
also found that children “are more vulnerable ... to 
negative influences and outside pressures”; they have 
limited “control over their own environment” and are 
therefore unable to extricate themselves from crime-
producing settings; and since a child’s character is 
not as “well formed” as an adult’s, his traits are “less 
fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of 
irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” 4  
Such youth need positive adult-youth interactions, 
feedback loops, and learning opportunities that 
help them with the developmental tasks of impulse 
control, judgment, future orientation, and emotional 
maturity. The punitive, coercive atmosphere of youth 
prisons provides none of these critical experiences.  
Justice-involved youth often have histories of abuse 
and failure by adults around them that add to the 
complexities of normal adolescent development. 
The trauma many of these young people have 
experienced makes them especially sensitive to 
environmental triggers, and yet, many are kept in 
institutional environments that seem designed to 
trigger trauma and rage: long periods of isolation; 
harsh, sterile surroundings; bright lights; a constant 
din; and a near-constant threat of violence.
A critical task of adolescence is to refine and deepen 
the sense of self and self-image (Erikson, 1959). Young 
people who come into contact with the juvenile 
justice system typically have experienced failure in 
a variety of settings and are in need of experiences 
that help them build a positive and prosocial self-
image. Youth prisons communicate to young people 
constantly and in a variety of ways that they are 
dangerous, feared, worthless, and have no real future. 
With this identity firmly in place, with more trauma 
and more deeply entrenched behaviors, they are sent 
back to their communities with little follow-up or 
connection to help get them back on track (Schubert 
and Mulvey, 2014).  
Beatings of children in custody were commonplace, 
inmates stuffed clothing around the toilets to keep out 
rats and cockroaches, young people were locked up for 
so long they often defecated or urinated in their cells. 
Youth who came in clean tested positive for marijuana 
after 30 days of confinement, suggesting it was easier 
to score drugs in my facility than on the streets of the 
District of Columbia. 
Vincent Schiraldi, New York Times, 2015
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Many of the youth who come into contact with 
the youth justice system enter it with diagnosable 
mental health and substance abuse problems, yet 
few receive help with these issues. A longitudinal 
study of 1,300 youth who were confined for serious 
offenses noted that few received services related to 
mental health issues in the residential setting. Even 
fewer received care once released, despite the finding 
that each added month of service reduced the odds of 
recidivism by 12 percent (Schubert and Mulvey, 2014). 
Finally, life-course criminological research has found 
that youth must cross several critical developmental 
“bridges” on the path to maturing out of delinquent 
behavior, with stable marriage and career path 
employment being two of the most important 
(Sampson and Laub, 1997). Yet commitment to a 
youth prison makes both less attainable (Holman 
and Ziedenberg, 2011).
No new institutions for adults should be built and 
existing institutions for juveniles should be closed. 
—National Advisory Commission on 
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973
The failure of the institutional model is not a new 
insight. More than 40 years ago, in 1973, the National 
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards 
and Goals found “The prison, the reformatory, and 
the jail have achieved only a shocking record 
of failure. There is overwhelming evidence that 
these institutions create crime rather than prevent 
it” (National Advisory Commission on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals, 1973). The Commission 
recommended that “no new institutions for adults 
should be built and existing institutions for juveniles 
should be closed.” Hundreds of thousands of young 
people have been subjected to these conditions since 
that report appeared.  
Abuse is Endemic
Staff at the facilities routinely used uncontrolled, 
unsafe applications of force, departing both from 
generally accepted standards and [departmental] 
policy. Anything from sneaking an extra cookie 
to initiating a fistfight may result in a full prone 
restraint with handcuffs. This one-size-fits-all control 
approach has, not surprisingly, led to an alarming 
number of serious injuries to youth, including 
concussions, broken or knocked-out teeth, and spiral 
fractures. 
—U.S. Department of Justice, 2009
That the type of maltreatment outlined above 
is endemic, rather than idiosyncratic, argues 
convincingly to abolish, rather than attempt to 
reform, the youth prison model.  
From 1979 to 2004, lawyers, the media, and advocacy 
organizations uncovered and documented abuses 
in state, local, or privately operated youth facilities 
in the District of Columbia and 23 states: Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah (Schiraldi 
and Soler, 2004).  
In 2008, the Associated Press surveyed every youth 
justice agency overseeing youth in confinement in 
the U.S. for information on the number of deaths, 
as well as the number of allegations and confirmed 
cases of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse by 
The Future of Youth Justice: A Community-Based Alternative to the Youth Prison Model | 7
Figure 1. Systemic or recurring maltreatment in juvenile corrections facilities in the 
states: 1970 to present
Violent/abusive conditions clearly documented after 2011
Violent/abusive conditions clearly documented after 2000 but not since 2011
Violent/abusive conditions clearly documented after 1990 but not since 2000
Violent/abusive conditions clearly documented after 1970 but not since 1990
Evidence but no proof of violent/abusive conditions since 2011
For this map, “systemic or recurring maltreatment” is identified when clear evidence has emerged from 
federal investigations, class-action lawsuits, or authoritative reports written by reputable media outlets or 
respected public or private agencies showing that — at least at one particular time — one or more state-
funded youth corrections facilities repeatedly failed to protect youth from violence by staff or other youth, 
sexual assaults, or excessive use of isolation or restraints. “Evidence but no proof” is indicated when  
credible reports of maltreatment have emerged, but not enough to satisfy the above criteria. 
 
For more information, visit aecf.org.  
 
Source: Mendel, 2015.
staff members from 2004 to 2007. The survey revealed 
13,000 allegations of abuse in facilities that housed 
46,000 youth in 2007 (Holbrook, 2008).  
In 2012, the Bureau of Justice Statistics conducted a 
national survey of sexual victimization of youth in 
state-funded youth correctional facilities. The study 
found that one in eight incarcerated young people 
reported being victimized sexually by staff or other 
youth in the facility in the year preceding the survey 
(Beck et al., 2013).  
Since 2011, the Annie E. Casey Foundation has 
released two reports on institutional conditions in 
youth prisons. In No Place for Kids (Mendel, 2011), 
Casey found that clear evidence of recurring or 
systemic maltreatment had been 
identified in the vast majority of 
states since 1970. In nearly half of the 
states, this clear record of systemic 
maltreatment had been documented 
in juvenile correctional facilities since 
2000. No Place for Kids also identified 
57 lawsuits in 33 states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico since 1970 
that resulted in a court-sanctioned 
remedy in response to allegations 
of systemic problems with violence, 
physical or sexual abuse by facility staff, 
or excessive use of isolation or physical 
restraints (see figure 1).
In 2015, Casey issued an update 
(Mendel, 2015) to No Place for Kids that 
showed that such atrocities were hardly 
a thing of the past:
• When No Place for Kids was published, no 
clear recent evidence of recurring or systemic 
maltreatment was available in Colorado, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Tennessee, or West Virginia. 
The updated report documented widespread 
maltreatment in each of these states, including 
high rates of youth-on-youth violence, sexual 
abuse, overreliance on physical restraints, 
and/or excessive use of isolation and solitary 
confinement.
• Compelling evidence of states violating the 
constitutional rights of confined youth continued in 
seven states — Arkansas, California, Florida, Nevada, 
New York, Ohio, and Texas — identified originally 
in No Place for Kids. In some cases, widespread 
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Correctional… 
Picture MJ, a 16-year-old who is on his way to the Elm Tree Correctional Center to begin serving an 18-month sentence. He is 
shackled and placed in the back of a van with three other teenage boys. He knows one of the guys, with whom he has hung out 
in his neighborhood, but the uniformed correctional officer tells them to shut up when anybody starts to talk. After about three 
hours, they arrive at an old and dingy building surrounded by two tall fences topped with razor wire. One big gate opens, they 
pull the van forward, and before the next gate opens, the one behind them clanks closed. The van doors open, and another officer 
yells his last name and tells him to get moving. They are directed into a vestibule where the door behind them bangs shut loudly. 
Then, the door in front of them buzzes and unlocks, and MJ is directed into a small cell. He hears doors clanging, voices yelling, 
walkie-talkies squawking, somebody barking out orders. After a while, two officers come in. He is told to strip naked and they 
conduct a detailed search of his body, including body cavities. He is handed an orange jumpsuit, underwear, socks, and slip-on 
shoes — most of which have obviously been worn by others in the past — and ordered to put them on. He is then led down a 
long hallway and into a large room with metal tables in the center, bolted down, ringed by a series of metal doors, each with a 
small window, some of which have faces staring blankly out of them. He doesn’t see any youth out of their cells in the common 
area. He is taken over to one of the doors, the officer unlocks it and tells him to go in, and then the door is locked behind him. 
His cot has a thin blanket on it, with no sheets or pillow on his plastic mattress, and there is a metal toilet-sink combination 
in one corner of the room. There is another bunk with another guy on it who was sleeping before he got there. His “cellie” just 
glares at him. A little while later, the door bangs open and he follows the other guys in a line down the corridor into a cafeteria, 
putting his hands behind his back as he notices the other boys do. The noise reverberates all around him as he takes a seat at a 
metal table, on an attached metal stool. A tray of food is placed in front of him, with plastic utensils to eat it with. It is something 
full of tomatoes and he knows he gets sick if he eats those things, so he just sits and watches.  
After dinner, he follows the line of boys back to their unit. When they get there, everyone hangs out in the big room, some 
watching TV, others playing cards. He starts to sit at one of the tables but realizes the only open seat is broken. And besides, the 
guys at the table glare at him, making it plain he is not welcome there. At 8 p.m., they are ordered into their cells. In there, he has 
nothing to do; his roommate has sneaked in a book (books are “contraband” in the rooms), so there’s not much conversation 
with him. The metal door with a scratched-up, barely transparent window is locked behind them with one of many big keys that 
the officer wears on his belt. At 10 p.m., staff yell that it’s “lights out” time and the light in his room is turned off from the outside.
He is awake most of the night, frightened by what he has seen and experienced during the day and the sounds he hears during 
the night. The next day, he is awakened at 6:30 a.m. by a bang on the door and his room’s light being turned back on. He takes 
a group shower with a bunch of other guys while one of the male officers looks on. After breakfast, he and the others in his unit 
are lined up and moved to the school room. Class is supposed to run from 8:30 to noon, but a fight breaks out in the hallway, 
so classes don’t start until 9:30. He hears a couple of the guys placing bets on how long this teacher will last. He has already 
been there a month, longer than some others. It is hard to tell when class officially gets under way, since kids keep getting 
into verbal — and sometimes physical — fights with other kids, staff, and teachers. Two of the guys get removed from the 
classroom, and he hears the officer tell one of them he’s going to solitary confinement and that both of them will lose their 
weekly family visitation and calls. 
At the end of his first 24 hours in Elm Tree, MJ has no idea what to expect next. All he knows is that he has never felt so alone 
and afraid in his life.
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 …Versus Home-Like Atmosphere  
Now, picture DS, also 16 years old, who is on his way to the Back on Track House where he knows he will stay at least through the 
end of the school year, around six to nine months, depending on his behavior. He is driven about 10 minutes to the house by a guy 
who calls himself a “counselor” and wears khaki pants and a “Back on Track” polo shirt. DS recognizes the building and the block it’s 
on; it’s a former school just around the corner from the barber shop where his uncle works. When they arrive, the counselor walks 
him to the door and rings a doorbell. He notices a fence much like the one that was there when it was a school, but now there’s no 
way to enter it or exit the school yard from the street. Another staff member opens the door, says hello, and escorts him into what 
used to be the principal’s office, calling him by his first name and saying that he’s been expecting him. The two counselors explain 
the need to pat him down, after which they walk him into a room with “Imani” (the name of the unit) posted in wooden letters on the 
outside. The room has some sofas and beanbag chairs in the middle, and some desks with computers on the side.  
There are three or four guys there who immediately introduce themselves to him. One of them, RM, comes over and says he is to 
be DS’s “buddy” to help him get settled and learn the ropes. With staff always within seeing and hearing range, RM takes DS down 
a short hallway with bedrooms on either side. The doors are open and he can see inside. Each has two beds; he can see people’s 
clothes and some family pictures on the walls. They get to his room and he meets his roommate, who tells him not to look so scared, 
that this place could actually help him if he works the program. He points to a poster on the wall that lists what is expected of every 
resident; he, his roommate, and his “buddy” go over the house rules while staff look on, chiming in occasionally. They show him 
where the bathrooms are, down the hall, and tell him to wash up for dinner. In the dining room, he sits next to his roommate at one 
of the wooden tables, along with eight or nine other guys and a counselor. The food is passed around family style, and there is a 
moment of silence so people can pray if they want to (but they don’t have to) before everyone starts eating. He is told that this room 
doubles as a place where kids’ families come and visit, which is allowed most evenings and is required with counseling staff twice 
a month. The counselor asks if anybody has something to bring up, and one of the guys suggests they give DS some pointers on 
what to expect and says he remembers how scared he was at the beginning. After dinner, his buddy tells him they are going back 
to the “day room” with the beanbags for “circle,” where they will talk about how their day went. After circle, everybody spreads out 
and starts to do homework. He doesn’t have any, so he picks a book from the bookshelves and reads. At 10 p.m., everybody heads 
to their rooms and to bed. The wooden door to their room is closed and locked for the evening by one of the counselors.
Before going to bed, his roommate helps him set his alarm clock and reminds him of the house rule that they’re all responsible for 
getting showered and to breakfast on time. The next morning, just as his alarm is going off, staff unlock the doors, greet the young 
people, and hang around the bathrooms while they shower in their own stalls and use the toilets. Breakfast, like dinner, is family 
style, and everybody cleans up after themselves. After breakfast and before school, they have a quick circle, more like a check-in 
to see where everyone is; people take special time to see how DS is doing, as it’s his first day.
After circle, he and the other nine boys in the Imani unit go to class together. In his classroom is a teacher, plus someone else he 
hasn’t met yet (he later learns that the man’s name is Raheem and he’s called an aide) as well as his unit’s counselor. The first class 
is history, and several of the guys make a PowerPoint presentation for a report they researched online about something he had 
never heard of (but which was really interesting) called the “Edmund Pettus Bridge.” 
After school, which ended at 3 p.m., his buddy tells him he can choose from “electives” — that day, a computer class or a poetry 
class — that groups from outside the facility run and where kids from Imani mingle with boys from other units. He chooses the 
computer class, which lasts until 4 p.m. The boys head back to their units and have free time until dinner. DS calls his mom, who 
tells him she’ll be coming by to visit him on Saturday with his uncle after the barber shop closes. They’ll all be meeting with one 
of the counselors to discuss DS’s treatment plan. He gets a little more information about what to expect from that session, when, 
during circle that evening, it was explained that he soon would have to develop (with the counselors and feedback from the group) 
goals for his time in treatment as well as a poster that explains his autobiography. He could see a few examples that other kids had 
done hanging on the walls of the day room. The group asks DS how he feels about his first day and he explains that, although he 
still wishes he was home, he’s beginning to feel like this place might help him get back on track.
10 | New Thinking in Community Corrections
maltreatment has persisted even years after states 
signed consent decrees agreeing to remedy 
problematic conditions within their facilities.
• All told, since 2000, systemic maltreatment has 
been documented in the juvenile corrections 
facilities of 29 states, with substantial evidence of 
maltreatment in three additional states. 
Impervious to Reform
Almost from inception and continually through 
today, significant yet sporadic, uneven, and 
ultimately unsuccessful efforts have been made to 
reform these reformatories.5 An impressive array of 
civil litigators arose at the national (e.g., Youth Law 
Center/National Center for Youth Law, 1970; the 
American Civil Liberties Union’s National Prison 
Project, 1972) and local (e.g., Juvenile Law Center, 
Pennsylvania, 1975; Prison Law Office, California, 
1979) levels to litigate conditions of confinement. In 
1980, the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons 
Act was enacted to protect the rights of people 
incarcerated in (among other places) youth facilities, 
energizing the U.S. Department of Justice’s role in 
youth prison litigation.  
Although significant victories have been won by civil 
litigators working to improve conditions, the basic 
nature of youth prisons remains. In 1994, the Office 
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(OJJDP) conducted a study of 995 public and private 
facilities in which youth were incarcerated in the 
U.S., including conducting site visits to 95 facilities 
and interviews with 475 youth. The agency reported 
“substantial and widespread” problems in living 
space, health care, security, and control of suicidal 
behavior. It also found deficiencies to be widespread 
and that few facilities it examined were without 
deficiencies (Parent et al., 1994).
Reformers come and reformers go. State institutions 
carry on.  Nothing in their history suggests they can 
sustain reform, no matter what money, what staff, 
and programs are pumped into them. The same 
crises that have plagued them for 150 years intrude 
today.  Though the cast may change, the players go 
on producing failure.  
—Jerome G. Miller, former Massachusetts Secretary 
of the Department of Youth Services
That these facilit ies have been impervious 
to reform efforts suggests that the harmful 
effects of incarceration are embedded in the 
physical facilities themselves and the nature 
of institutionalization. Changes in leadership, 
training, or enriched programming ultimately 
are trumped by correctional physical plants, the 
great distance most facilities are from families and 
oversight mechanisms, and the bureaucratization 
and institutionalization such facilities engender. 
Large, institutional structures, surrounded by 
razor wire and filled with noise and harsh lighting, 
create a toxic environment. The staff and kids 
are inevitably caught in their roles of guard and 
prisoner, locking both into a struggle of power and 
resistance. Life in these places is about violence and 
control, submission, and defiance, leaving little 
room for the guidance, learning, role-modeling, 
and caring relationships that young people need 
(Rothman, 1980). This guard versus prisoner 
dynamic, which is evident in adult settings as 
well (Zimbardo et al., 1972), is exacerbated by the 
general power differential that exists between 
youth and adults.
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There have been efforts at reform, but they typically 
have been isolated and short-lived. In the 1970s, 
Massachusetts Secretary of the Department of Youth 
Services, Jerome G. Miller, attempted to reform the 
facilities under his jurisdiction, which included 
two of the first training schools opened in America, 
the Lyman and Shirley Schools. Miller sought to 
create therapeutic communities with humanized 
living environments in which youth were treated 
with dignity and respect. Therapeutic communities 
are characterized by self-help and peer-centered 
strategies, traits typically alien to youth prisons.
Miller’s modest, incremental reform efforts were 
met with intense opposition — and occasional 
sabotage — from entrenched staff (Krisberg, 
forthcoming). Eventually, instead of trying to 
change what he came to believe was the essential 
nature of youth prisons, Miller decided to close 
them. Over a two-year period, he closed all eight 
Massachusetts youth prisons that housed more 
than 600 young people.  
He described what led him to decide to close — rather 
than continue to attempt to reform — Massachusetts’ 
training schools: “But whenever I thought 
we’d made progress [in reforming the training 
schools] something happened — a beating, a 
kid in an isolation cell, an offhand remark by a 
superintendent or cottage supervisor told me what 
I envisioned would never be allowed. Reformers 
come and reformers go. State institutions carry on. 
Nothing in their history suggests they can sustain 
reform, no matter what money, what staff, and 
programs are pumped into them. The same crises 
that have plagued them for 150 years intrude today. 
Though the cast may change, the players go on 
producing failure” (Miller, 1991). 
When custody meets care, custody always wins.  
—David Rothman
Correctional historian David Rothman explains that 
it is the deep-rooted nature of these institutions that 
argues for their elimination: “There is [a] character 
to institutions that is not easily curbed — and 
this is in two senses. For one, institutions appear 
so convenient to the ordinary citizen, so easy a 
way of getting rid of troublesome or ugly or needy 
persons, that as long as the institutional option 
exists, alternatives will never be properly organized 
and supported. For another, the heads and direct 
beneficiaries of institutions, be they employees 
or building contractors, have a way of dominating 
the budgets so as to prevent the growth of quality 
alternatives. That this institutional tenacity … is 
deep rooted and perhaps even inevitable, emerges 
from an examination of the fate of earlier Progressive 
efforts to move to community care” (Rothman, 1980).
Or, as Rothman later stated more succinctly, 
“When custody meets care, custody always wins’’ 
(Newsweek staff, 1994).
Rothman’s analysis of the resistance of the 
institutional model to downsizing holds true to the 
present day. Gladys Carrión, former commissioner 
of New York state’s Office of Children and Family 
Services, which manages the state’s youth prisons, 
encountered fierce opposition from facility staff 
and local elected officials as she tried to (and did) 
close youth prisons in New York. The resistance 
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included numerous votes of no confidence in 
legislative bodies and intense organizing efforts to 
fight facility closures — even when facilities were 
fully or almost completely empty of youth (Bernstein, 
2014). Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services 
Director Vincent Schiraldi was subject to two votes 
of no confidence by facility staff when he closed 
Washington, D.C.’s notorious Oak Hill Youth Center, 
despite the fact that the facility had been under a 
consent decree for abusive and unconstitutional 
conditions for more than 20 years when it finally 
closed (McCabe, 2006). And Jerome Miller 
experienced numerous acts of staff sabotage and 
enormous political pressure when he closed all of 
Massachusetts’ youth prisons in the early 1970s 
(Miller, 1991).
The recurring and ubiquitous scandalous conditions 
that have plagued youth prisons since their 
inception — sometimes despite the best efforts of 
very dedicated people — strongly suggest that it is the 
nature of these institutions themselves, rather than 
the temporary misbehavior of this superintendent or 
that juvenile corrections administrator, that is at the 
heart of the problem with the youth prison model. As 
Miller points out, the history of correctional reform 
reveals a cycle of scandal and abuse, followed by 
surface-level reforms; followed by gradual entropy 
during a period of calm; followed inevitably by 
scandal, abuse, and once again, calls for reform 
(Miller, 1987). The consistent failure of youth prisons 
to protect youth and improve their outcomes — along 
with the institutional model’s stubborn resistance to 
transformation — argues for the replacement, rather 
than the improvement, of youth prisons.
High (and Rising) Costs, Negative Benefits
Youth prisons are not just a failed and harmful 
strategy. Their financial costs are enormous. 
According to a 2015 report by the Justice Policy 
Institute, the cost of incarceration varies from state to 
state, but averages $401 per day and $146,302 per year 
in each state’s high-cost facilities. Taking length of 
stay into account, 34 states report spending $100,000 
or more to incarcerate one young person (Justice 
Policy Institute, 2015). Moreover, the financial costs 
continue to grow long after release from confinement. 
Being incarcerated has lifelong negative effects on 
the young people whose prospects are dimmed. The 
long-term financial costs to society can be estimated 
in such terms as lost future earnings and government 
tax revenue, and higher spending on Medicaid and 
Medicare. It is estimated that the long-term societal 
costs generated by one year of incarcerating youth in 
the U.S. range from $8 billion to $21 billion (Justice 
Policy Institute, 2015). 
The practice of committing youth to large institutions 
that fail to provide for their developmental needs 
is both costly in financial terms and ineffective in 
furthering the goal of crime prevention.  
—National Research Council
It is reasonable to ask what we get when we subject 
young people, society, and public budgets to these 
human and financial costs. There is evidence that 
youth who have been institutionalized get into 
worse trouble, are more likely to commit worse 
crimes, are less employable, are more likely to be 
on a path toward lifelong failure, and are more 
likely to pass their problems on to their children.6 
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For example, Nguyen and colleagues (2016) found 
that correctional environments can facilitate the 
accumulation of “criminal capital” and might 
actually encourage offending by serving as a “school 
of crime” and increasing post-release earnings from 
crime. If one were looking to create a feeder system 
for adult prisons, one could hardly do better than our 
current approach.  
Despite the high costs that states expend each year 
on juvenile prisons, the outcomes are sorely wanting. 
Even if our only goal was to improve public safety, 
youth prisons would be deemed a failure. Each 
state reports its own recidivism rate using unique 
definitions, so there is no single national measure. 
However, state-by-state data reveal that 70 to 
80 percent of incarcerated youth are rearrested 
within two to three years (Mendel, 2011). Mounting 
evidence from the best statistical analyses suggests 
that incarceration of youth may actually increase the 
likelihood of recidivism (Aos et al., 2004; Baglivio, 
2009; Greenwood et al., 1996; Lipsey, 1992).  
For example, Aizer and Doyle (2013) used the 
incarceration tendency of randomly assigned judges 
to estimate the causal effects of youth incarceration 
on high school completion and adult recidivism. 
Examining more than 35,000 juvenile offenders 
over 10 years, they found that youth incarceration 
results in substantially lower high school completion 
rates and higher adult incarceration rates, including 
incarceration for violent crimes. Furthermore, they 
found that incarceration for this age group was 
extremely disruptive, greatly reducing the likelihood 
of ever returning to school, and, for those who do, 
significantly increasing their likelihood of being 
classified with an emotional or behavioral disorder 
(Aizer and Doyle, 2013). Numerous other studies 
suggest that incarceration produces worse outcomes 
for low-risk youth when compared with home-based 
services.  
An incarceration program is not an employment 
program … [We] don’t put other people in juvenile 
justice facilities to give some people jobs.  
—New York Governor Andrew Cuomo 
In 2013, the National Research Council, the nation’s 
premier, nonpartisan research institute, published 
a comprehensive review of research on juvenile 
justice in the U.S. The Council concluded that well-
designed community programs are more likely to 
reduce recidivism and improve youth well-being than 
institutionalization. Citing the harm from placement 
in large, distant institutions, they found that, for the 
small number of youth who require confinement, 
proximity to their communities is less disruptive. “The 
practice of committing youth to large institutions that 
fail to provide for their developmental needs is both 
costly in financial terms and ineffective in furthering 
the goal of crime prevention” (Bonnie et al., 2013). 
As youth incarceration declines, it can lead to 
skyrocketing per-youth costs as staff reductions and 
facility closures fail to keep up with the decline in 
incarcerated youth. Connecticut’s sole remaining 
youth prison, the 250-cell Connecticut Juvenile 
Training School, has a $53 million annual budget 
but houses only 43 boys (Kovner, 2016). When he was 
first elected governor, New York’s Andrew Cuomo 
toured a youth prison in upstate New York running 
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Figure 2. Youth in California state-operated facilities and annual institutional cost 
per ward, 1996 to 2008
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with ample staff but housing no youth, prompting 
Cuomo to exclaim in his state-of-the-state address, 
“An incarceration program is not an employment 
program … [We] don’t put other people in juvenile 
justice facilities to give some people jobs. That’s not 
what this state is all about, and that has to end.”
As youth crime declined in California and the 
state legislature passed a series of laws to reduce 
youth incarceration, the number of confined youth 
dropped from nearly 10,000 in 1996 to around 1,700 
by 2008. During that time, the cost of incarceration 
in the state’s youth prisons rose almost sevenfold, 
from $36,000 per youth per year to $252,000 
(Schiraldi, Schindler, and Goliday, 2011) (see figure 
2). California policymakers learned this lesson and, 
effective in 2008, disrupted this pattern by banning 
commitments of all but the most serious juvenile 
offenders to state institutions, closing eight of its 
11 large youth corrections facilities by 2012 (see 
sidebar on page 21) (Steinhart, 2013). 
California’s state-incarcerated youth 
population plummeted to just 600 
inmates by 2013; during this period, 
per-capita costs also declined, but 
then leveled out in order to support 
improved programming for the serious 
offenders who remained in state 
custody. 
Although many systems need to 
increase their cost per youth to 
provide better staff-to-youth ratios and 
improve programming, it is clear from 
these and other examples that political 
pressures make it difficult for even 
cost-conscious policymakers to close 
youth prisons as fast as they downsize.
Change at Scale Is Possible
With the right models, technical assistance, and 
leadership, incarcerated youth populations can 
be significantly downsized without negatively 
affecting public safety. In 1993, the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation launched the Juvenile Detention 
Alternatives Initiative (JDAI). At a time when 
adult and youth incarceration rates were sharply 
increasing nationally, JDAI challenged firmly rooted 
but outmoded beliefs, countering deeply entrenched 
interests and reinforcing the political courage of 
key leaders to reform the youth detention system. 
Working collaboratively with sites, advocates, 
experts, researchers, philanthropies, and providers, 
JDAI is now in place in nearly 300 local jurisdictions 
across 39 states.  
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Figure 3. International youth incarceration rates (per 100,000 in 2010)
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The Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and 
Social Policy at the University of California, Berkeley 
(2012), found that within 23 states where JDAI was 
operating prior to 2010, detention populations had 
fallen 2.5 times more in participating counties 
(down 42 percent) than in the states as a whole 
(17 percent). Furthermore, the 112 JDAI sites that 
provide data reported that they sent 5,254 fewer 
youth to correctional facilities in 2011 than in the 
year prior to joining JDAI. Ninety percent of JDAI 
sites reported data showing improved public-safety 
outcomes versus pre-JDAI (Mendel, 2014). Although 
these findings focus on declining rates of youth in 
preadjudication detention, they suggest that it is 
possible to have both fewer incarcerated youth and 
less youth crime.
Policymakers and advocates will need to be mindful of 
both fiscal and political forces as they push for facility 
closures. In New York, for example, Governor Cuomo 
not only used the bully pulpit of the governor’s office 
to spur closures, but he also created a 
$50 million fund and tax credits to aid 
communities in which a youth or adult 
prison closed (King, 2011).
International Context
Nations in the rest of the world either 
never went down this road or are far 
ahead of us in abandoning it in favor of 
more effective systems. By all measures 
available, the United States incarcerates 
youth at a substantially higher rate 
than does any other country. Although 
international comparisons of juvenile 
incarceration rates are challenging 
due to reporting variations, the U.S. is 
consistently found to be greatly “out-
incarcerating” other countries. For example, a study 
published in 2008 (Hazel, 2008) reported that the U.S. 
incarceration rate for our youth was nearly five times 
that of the next closest country, South Africa. Similarly, 
using 2006 data from the European Sourcebook of 
Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics and the United 
States’ Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 
Killias, Redondo, and Sarnecki (2012) found that the 
youth incarceration rate in the U.S. consistently and 
dramatically exceeds that of European countries.
The latest data available from the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (Jandl, 2016) 
also show that rates of youth incarceration in the 
U.S. far exceed those of other countries (see figure 
3). According to the UNODC data, published in 
2011 (using data from 2010), the U.S. incarcerates 
youth at more than twice the rate of the next highest 
incarcerating country (Cyprus) and nearly six times 
the rate of the Russian Federation.
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Figure 4. Disparity in youth incarceration rates, 2013
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Which Youth Are Behind Bars?
Higher rates of youth incarceration are not 
inevitable; rather, they are driven by policy choices 
made by adults. First, a substantial majority of youth 
incarcerated in the U.S. are not behind bars for the 
kinds of crimes that scare most Americans. Sixty-
three percent of locked-up youth were incarcerated 
for something other than a person offense, such as 
drug or public order offenses or property crimes 
(Sickmund et al., 2015). This category includes 
17 percent who were incarcerated for probation 
violations (technical violations) and five percent 
who were there for status offenses (behaviors that 
would not be considered a crime if committed by an 
adult) (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, 2013).  
Furthermore, the likelihood of being incarcerated 
is inf luenced by individual, family, and social 
characteristics (Gatti, Tremblay, and Vitaro, 
2009). The heavy concentration of boys of color 
i n yout h pr isons u nderscores 
both the effect of socioeconomic 
disparities in American society on 
youth outcomes and the impact of 
race on dispositions. In 2013, rates 
of confinement were 2.7 times higher 
for youth of color than rates for white 
youth (Petteruti, Schindler, and 
Ziedenberg, 2014). Black youth that 
year were incarcerated at 4.7 times the 
rate of white youth, Native American 
youth were incarcerated at 3.3 times 
the rate of white youth, Latino youth 
were incarcerated at 1.7 times the 
rate of white youth, and Asian youth 
were incarcerated 30 percent more 
frequently than were white youth.
These national disparities mask much more 
profound disparities at the state level. For example, 
African-American youth in New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, and Wisconsin were incarcerated at 36.5, 
25.3, and 16.3 times the rate of white youth in their 
states, respectively. The map in figure 4 depicts 
the varying rates of racial disparities in youth 
incarceration in the United States.  
Even after controlling for present offense and prior 
record, researchers have found “race effects” — evidence 
of unwarranted racial disparities not explained by 
factors such as offense severity or prior record — in 
the youth justice system. A meta-analysis of 46 
studies of youth justice processing and minority 
status conducted by Pope and Feyerherm revealed 
that two-thirds of the studies showed race 
effects at varying points in the system (Pope and 
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Feyerherm, 1995). After controlling for other case 
characteristics, they found unwarranted disparities 
in case-processing decisions such as detention, 
prosecution, and commitments to youth prisons. 
Furthermore, the meta-analysis revealed that these 
effects are cumulative. Relatively small differences 
in outcomes at early stages of the process became 
exacerbated as black and brown youth progressed 
through the system.
Even after controlling for present offense and prior 
record, researchers have found … unwarranted racial 
disparities … in the youth justice system.
Bridges and Steen analyzed 233 probation 
reports for youth in family court and found 
that, controlling for offense severity and prior 
record, probation officers ascribed black youth’s 
delinquency to negative attitudinal and personality 
traits and white youth’s delinquency to external 
environmental issues beyond their control. These 
perceptions led to a heightened assessment of the 
risk of African-American youth and more punitive 
sentencing recommendations for them (Bridges and 
Steen, 1998).  
Disturbingly, as high disparities between people of color 
and whites have declined in the criminal justice system 
in the 1990s and 2000s (Travis, Western, and Redburn, 
2014), black-white disparities in the incarceration of 
youth have increased (Rovner, 2016; Hager, 2015).
A fundamental reason that the failed youth prison 
model has persisted for 170 years is that the youth, 
families, and communities most affected are 
seen as “others,” not as “ours” (Alexander, 2012). 
For decades, adolescents in trouble with the law 
have been portrayed as scary, predatory, and less 
than human (Schiraldi, 2001).7 Black and brown 
youth predominate in these images, invoking 
all of this country’s predilection for negative 
racial stereotypes. These images dominate our 
understanding and prevent us from seeing them 
as they actually are (Dorfman and Schiraldi, 2001), 
as we would see them if they were our own children 
or a neighbor’s child. They prevent us from seeing 
them as young people with creativity, and energy, 
and smarts, and possibility, in need of help to get 
back on track and very much worth the investment. 
Recommendations — Reduce, Reform, 
Replace, Reinvest
It is long past time to choose a different path, 
one that aligns the moral, ethical, and human 
imperative with fiscal prudence, safer communities, 
and better youth outcomes. The momentum is 
beginning to shift. Leaders from the President to 
the Pope are calling for a halt to heavy reliance on 
incarceration. Early-adopter states and localities are 
trying alternative approaches. Youth incarceration, 
while still high, is plummeting. Evidence-builders 
are showing the way.
The call for the closure of youth prisons does 
not mean that there are not some young people 
for whom secure confinement is the right and 
necessary solution. But even for them, harsh, 
punit ive, inhumane, and developmentally 
inappropriate settings are not the right place; certainly 
not if the goal is — as it should be — positive youth 
development and rehabilitation.  
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The right solution is a comprehensive one, achieved 
through simultaneous and well-sequenced actions 
to reorient the system into one that is driven by 
the goal of helping youth get back on track, and 
prioritizing youth development and accountability 
over mindless punishment. To succeed, such systems 
will need to close down all publicly operated or 
contracted youth prisons and build a developmentally 
appropriate continuum of services. The necessary 
steps comprise four domains of action — reduce, 
reform, replace, and reinvest.
Reduce
We can safely reduce the pipeline into youth 
prisons by at least half. States can do so by limiting 
commitment to youth prisons to only youth who 
have committed serious offenses and pose clear 
and demonstrable risks to public safety. Enacting 
statutes that limit the categories of youth who are 
eligible for correctional placement can help make 
this happen (Mendel, 2011). When Texas and 
California statutorily limited youth corrections to 
youth with more serious convictions and reallocated 
savings to counties to fund local solutions to youth 
offending, both states experienced marked declines 
in youth incarceration and offending.
Indeed, from 2001 to 2013, there was a 53-percent 
decline in youth incarceration in the U.S., with 
youth incarceration declining by double digits in 
48 states. During that time, each of the nation’s 
five largest states experienced youth incarceration 
declines of nearly two-thirds.
Driven largely by steep reductions in youth crime 
rates, the likelihood that a young person in our 
country will be confined in an out-of-home 
placement is now the lowest in at least 40 years. 
Among youth who are committed to state custody, 
the percentage held in facilities with more than 200 
beds shrunk from 52 percent to 18 percent between 
2001 and 2013 (Sickmund et al., 2015). There were 
970 fewer juvenile facilities operating in the U.S. 
in 2012 than in 2002, a 33-percent decline. The 
largest facilities have closed disproportionately; 
for example, there has been a 66-percent decline 
in the number of facilities with a capacity of more 
than 200 juveniles (Rovner, 2015).
The footprint of the youth corrections system and 
the facilities themselves have shrunk substantially 
in the past decade, offering a once-in-a-generation 
opportunity to eliminate youth prisons entirely. 
Closi ng t hese i nst it ut ions wou ld enable 
reinvestment of the savings into a system marked 
by rigorous in-home programming, and, for the 
small number of those who need to be incarcerated, 
small, homelike facilities that are close enough to 
the youth’s home communities to maintain and 
encourage family involvement.
The normal course of adolescent development 
helps make reducing the pipeline by at least half a 
feasible goal. Most youth will age out of challenging 
behaviors if they do not experience the trauma and 
adverse conditions that convert normal, transitory 
risk-taking and impulsive behaviors into deeply 
embedded identity (Bonnie et al., 2013). A review of 
international evidence on young people who come 
into contact with the law found “[D]iversionary 
approaches may be appropriate for young people 
who commit low-level offences, given that some will 
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desist from crime without intervention and [that] 
drawing these young people into the formal youth 
justice system may increase their offending” (Adler 
et al., 2016).
Part of the reason that the pipeline can be reduced 
so significantly without risk to public safety is that 
so many of those who are sent to youth prisons are 
incarcerated for offenses that the public finds more 
amenable to community-based placement. Nearly 
half (46 percent) of the young people who spent time 
in youth prisons in 2013 were not there for offenses 
against persons or were incarcerated for status 
offenses; another 17 percent were incarcerated for 
technical violations of probation (Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2013).  
There are recent and long-standing examples of 
states that have successfully and significantly 
reduced their rates of incarceration without 
an increase in crime. Under the Close to Home 
initiative (see sidebar, page 23), New York City 
reduced the number of youth it confined and 
transferred nearly all city youth from distant, 
upstate facilities to small, local facilities. Youth 
incarceration in the city fell by 53 percent and 
youth arrests declined by half (Schiraldi, 2015b). 
Texas (see sidebar, page 20) achieved a 65-percent 
reduction in the number of youth in state secure 
facilities and a simultaneous 33-percent drop in 
youth arrests (Fabelo et al., 2015).    
Massachusetts offers evidence from a decades-long 
example. Studies of the rapid deinstitutionalization 
there found that youth served in the community 
had levels of recidivism no worse than youth who 
were previously incarcerated (Ohlin, Coates, and 
Miller, 1975). In California, youth arrests, property 
crime, and violent crime all steadily declined over 
a period in which the state was drastically reducing 
its incarcerated youth population from more than 
10,000 to less than 1,000 (Krisberg et al., 2010).  
The case studies that follow illustrate how different 
jurisdictions have experimented successfully 
with efforts to reduce, reform, and/or replace 
their youth prisons and, in some cases, reinvest 
savings into community-based programs. These 
vignettes are for illustration purposes and to spur 
local innovation. To be clear, none of these systems 
has found perfect solutions to all the complicated 
challenges of adolescent delinquency or systemic 
reform, and we know that innovations in one 
jurisdiction cannot be seamlessly transplanted into 
another. Nevertheless, they offer both examples 
and evidence of the feasibility of reducing the 
pipeline, reforming systems of intervention, 
replacing youth prisons, and creating opportunities 
for reinvestment into more effective approaches. 
Reform
We can reduce the pipeline and close youth prisons 
if we also reform the culture, configuration, and 
decision-making processes so that the entire system 
comes to focus on achieving positive outcomes for 
every youth. To do so means both programmatic 
and practice reforms.  
Prog rammat ica l ly, t his means ex panding 
dispositional alternatives, especially community-
based and family-centered programs that are 
proven to work with young people who have 
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serious problems, and ensuring that youth are 
matched with the right programs (Schiraldi, 
Schindler, and Goliday, 2011). Such an expanded 
array of alternatives would give judges better 
options for matching youth needs and the degree of 
supervision needed with effective options (Mendel, 
2011). Effectively using an expanded array of 
services depends on changes in policies, practices, 
and procedures throughout the system, so that each 
youth is matched to the most appropriate services, 
including diverting those for whom no formal court 
procedure is necessary. Rigorous assessment of 
community programs to ensure that public dollars 
are being spent wisely, and that such programs are 
improving outcomes and public safety, are critical 
elements in maintaining the confidence of the 
public and system stakeholders in a community-
based (rather than an institution-based) system. 
Programmatic and practice reforms go together 
hand-in-glove, and must be implemented 
simultaneously to maximize effectiveness.  
The National Research Council of the National 
Academies, in Reforming Juvenile Justice: A 
Developmental Approach, describes a number of 
programmatic components that are essential to 
well-designed community-based programs. These 
principles include (Bonnie et al., 2013): 
1. Limiting and structuring contact with antisocial 
peers and encouraging contact with prosocial 
peers.
2. Keeping youth proximate to their communities, 
which is less disruptive of their developmental 
progress.
3. Involving parents and ensuring family engagement.
4. Providing a social context that has ample 
opportunity and structures for healthy 
development and that provides youth with the 
tools to deal with negative influences that might 
be present in the settings they will encounter in 
the future.
Texas — Reduce, Reinvest  
In 2007, the Texas legislature enacted reforms intended to significantly reduce the pipeline of youth into state custody. SB 103 
prohibits the commitment to state-run secure facilities of youth who are adjudicated delinquent for misdemeanors and limits 
stays in youth prisons to age 19. This policy change was accompanied by the creation of a formula-based block grant program 
that allocates funds to counties to help cover the costs of local supervision and treatment of youth who would no longer be sent 
to state facilities. Since these changes were enacted, the number of youth confined in state-run secure facilities has decreased 
by more than two-thirds (2,800 youth) and eight Texas state youth prisons have been closed, saving the state $150 million. Over 
this period, state funds allocated for local programs have increased by 38 percent. However, it is up to each county to determine 
how to deploy the funds. Some counties have chosen to establish county-run secure facilities, so some number of the youth 
covered by SB 103 are still being housed in secure facilities. Partially as a response, the Community Connections Diversion 
Program was established in 2009, and $50 million was appropriated to provide financial incentives to county governments to use 
alternatives to confinement. The overall Juvenile Justice Department budget also reflects the state’s emphasis on alternatives. 
For fiscal year 2014, one-half of the department’s total budget was allocated to community juvenile justice, including prevention 
and intervention, supervision, community programs, diversion initiatives, alternative education, and mental health services. 
Source: Fabelo et al., 2015.
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California — Reduce, Reform, Reinvest  
Over the past 20 years, California has instituted a number of reforms aimed at reducing the number of youth in state custody. 
AB 2312, enacted in 1996, required counties to cover a share of the cost of committing local youth to state facilities and 
appropriated $33 million to support local youth justice programs to provide counties with more options. Simultaneously, 
challenge and facilities grants gave counties funds to create a graduated series of sanctions and to build local youth facilities. 
In 2007, legislation was enacted that further narrowed the pipeline by reserving commitments to state facilities for youth who 
have committed serious offenses. Along with these changes, the state has also enacted programs to increase prevention (AB 
1913 in 2000) and to incentivize diversion from state custody to county probation (the California Probation Subsidy Act). The 
result of these changes has been a dramatic 80-percent decrease in youth in state facilities (700 in 2015 versus 10,000 in 1996) 
and the closure of eight of California’s 11 large youth prisons (Steinhart, 2013). Nevertheless, some youth still are housed in 
prisonlike settings, managed by the county rather than the state. Moreover, Proposition 21 passed in 2000, making it much 
easier for youth to be tried as adults and sentenced to adult facilities. A ballot initiative, supported by Governor Jerry Brown, 
will appear on the ballot in November 2016 to overturn most of the provisions of Proposition 21 and return the decision about 
whether youth will be tried as adults to judges.
Source: Krisberg et al., 2010.
5. Offering opportunities for academic success and 
activities that contribute to developing decision-
making and critical thinking skills. 
This kind of prosocial, developmentally appropriate 
milieu creates the context in which youth can be 
provided with high-quality/high-expectation 
programs and early work experience that will 
enable them to get back on track and move forward 
on the school-to-work pathway. These types of 
skills and experiences are as vital to ensuring long-
term success as are the prosocial cognitive and 
behavioral interventions.  
Policies and practices that can divert youth from 
entering the system include rethinking zero-tolerance 
school discipline policies, making better use of police 
and diversion, and instituting detention reforms 
such as those implemented and proven effective at 
reducing detention populations without risk to public 
safety under JDAI. In addition, enhancing the legal 
representation that youth receive can help ensure that 
their individual circumstances and needs are taken 
into account, reducing unnecessary confinement 
while also ensuring that rehabilitative needs are 
identified and met.  
Probation reforms are needed to ensure a calibrated 
response to rule violations, so that each case is 
carefully considered and a decision to confine is 
carefully reviewed (Mendel, 2011). Community 
corrections staff, whether public employees or 
staff of nonprofits, should be thoroughly trained 
on adolescent development and on positive youth 
development so they can deliver asset-focused, 
trauma-informed care to the youth under their 
supervision, and can recommend removal from 
the home only when other options are exhausted.
Community-based services offer a public policy 
“win-win” — they achieve better outcomes than do 
institutional placements at lower cost. Compared 
with $400 per day or more for incarceration, 
individualized, community-based wraparound 
services can cost as little as $75 per day (Justice 
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Policy Institute, 2014) for those youth who need such 
services (and many do not). Research confirms that 
there is no intervention that is more effective when 
delivered in an institutional setting than when 
delivered in a community-based one. Moreover, 
helping youth in community settings avoids the 
additional negative experiences of confinement in 
youth prisons (Howell and Lipsey, 2012).  
Any intervention that places youths within a deviant 
group therefore risks exacerbating and consolidating 
their antisocial behavior.  
—Gatti, Tremblay, and Vitaro (2009)
A continuum of community-based services should 
emphasize evidence-based family intervention 
models. A family is the best place for kids — birth 
families where possible, or other family settings 
such as kin or supportive foster care when it is 
not. Effective programs help families provide the 
guidance, support, and structure that help kids 
get back on track. A good example is Treatment 
Foster Care Oregon, an evidence-based alternative 
to incarceration or group placement for young 
people who have been adjudicated delinquent. 
Community families are recruited, trained, and 
closely supervised as they provide treatment and 
intensive supervision. Boys who participated in the 
program had fewer subsequent arrests, fewer days 
of incarceration, less self-reported drug use, fewer 
violent offense referrals, and fewer self-reported 
incidents of violence than did a control group 
(Blueprints for Healthy Youth Development, 2012). 
Other evidence-based family intervention models 
include Multisystemic Therapy and Functional 
Family Therapy (for youth with tenable families), 
among others (Mendel, 2011).  
But these kinds of family-based interventions are 
not enough. The youth justice system must also 
provide services, supports, and opportunities that 
connect young people to school; employment; 
and prosocial adults, peers, and activities. Butts, 
Bazemore, and Meroe (2010) have coined the 
phrase “positive youth justice” to describe an 
approach to building on the strengths of youth in 
the delinquency system, rather than merely trying 
to extinguish their deficits. In guidance to states 
that are creating their annual juvenile justice plans 
pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act, OJJDP urges state advisor y 
groups to create opportunities “for positive youth 
development that assist delinquent and other 
at-risk youth in obtaining (1) a sense of safety and 
structure, (2) a sense of belonging and membership, 
(3) a sense of self-worth and social contribution, 
(4) a sense of independence and control over one’s 
life, and (5) a sense of closeness in interpersonal 
relationships” (Butts, Bazemore, and Meroe, 2010).
In some cases, it becomes necessary to remove 
kids from their own families or neighborhoods for 
a period. Such removals should strive to maintain 
family and community ties as much as possible by 
using close-to-home/community-based facilities 
and limiting the duration to the shortest possible, 
as determined by the young person’s readiness. 
Research supports the importance of having a 
continuum of community-based programs that 
can match services to youth’s needs. One study 
concluded that “any intervention that places youths 
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within a deviant group therefore risks exacerbating 
and consolidating their antisocial behavior” and that 
“the more restrictive and more intense the justice 
system intervention was, the greater was its negative 
impact” (Gatti, Tremblay, and Vitaro, 2009).
Research comparing placement in youth facilities 
with community-based treatment finds that 
community-based treatment is associated with 
better overall outcomes in terms of schooling 
and other markers of successful adjustment for 
individual young people (Lipsey, Wilson, and 
Cohen, 2000).  
Replace
For the few youth for whom secure placement is 
necessary, a commitment is needed to replace 
New York City — Reduce, Reform, Replace, Reinvest  
Over the past several years, New York state and New York City have taken steps to establish a continuum of options to match 
youth needs and decision processes that direct youth to the most appropriate level of supervision and custody. Beginning in 
2003, a variety of reform efforts were instituted that, by 2011, reduced the number of youth being sent to residential placement 
by 55 percent (Ferone, Salsich, and Fratello, 2014). For instance, Esperanza, contracted for by the Probation Department 
(initially from the Vera Institute of Justice), and the Juvenile Justice Initiative (JJI), contracted for by the city’s Administration 
for Children’s Services, provide short-term crisis management and cognitive behavioral therapy (Esperanza) and Multisystemic 
Therapy or Functional Family Therapy (JJI) (Ferone, Salsich, and Fratello, 2014). Furthermore, the city initiated a new detention-
risk-assessment instrument coupled with a range of detention alternatives that reduced detention and preadjudication arrest 
rates, likely resulting in a reduction in youth committed post-adjudication.
Then, in 2012, the legislature enacted Close to Home, which shifted responsibility for placements from New York state to the 
city. Unlike the distant, prisonlike state facilities traditionally used to house youth, the city’s placements are in small (24 beds 
or smaller) settings almost exclusively within the city’s boundaries and, therefore, close to family and community. In proposing 
Close to Home, Mayor Michael Bloomberg stated, “The current system is not helping kids, it isn’t helping taxpayers, and it isn’t 
helping public safety” (Brooks, 2010).
The current system is not helping kids, it isn’t helping taxpayers, and it isn’t helping public safety. 
— New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
Since bringing placements into the city in smaller, noncorrectional settings, New York City has continued to see the number 
of placements fall considerably, as Close to Home has expanded its use of nonresidential alternatives and introduced a series 
of practice reforms aimed at keeping young people in the community. In addition to the continued use of Esperanza and JJI, 
the city has implemented several additional programs that focus on building skills and competencies. The programs include 
Advocate, Intervene, and Mentor (AIM), through which young people engage with an advocate from their community for at least 
seven hours per week; Every Child Has an Opportunity to Excel and Succeed (ECHOES), through which specialized probation 
officers build positive adult relationships, employment skills, and social-emotional competence; and Pathways to Excellence, 
Achievement, and Knowledge (PEAK), an educational day/evening school-based program for youth who are disconnected from 
school or are disruptive while in school (Ferone, Salsich, and Fratello, 2014).
An additional key element in New York’s approach is a new, structured decision-making process implemented by the probation 
department to ensure that dispositional recommendations are fair and balanced. This process helps to ensure that each young 
person is matched to the level of supervision and type of services warranted, limiting the use of secure confinement to a last resort. 
Source: Schiraldi, 2015b.
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Virginia — Reduce, Reform, Replace, Reinvest
Virginia is one of the most recent states to take on the challenge of closing youth prisons and is doing so with a sequenced, 
multifaceted approach. At the front end, the state is reducing the pipeline through a variety of changes to detention policies, 
procedures, and training, decreasing the number of youth held in secure detention by 20 percent over two years.   
For youth committed to state custody, the creation of alternatives, along with other changes, has helped to reduce the population 
by about 40 percent over two years. A key contributor to this decrease was a 12-percent decrease in the length of stay, achieved 
through improved case management and increased use of stepdown placements. The state’s Secretary of Public Safety, Brian 
Moran, said of youth in state custody, “The longer they stay, the more we spend on them, the worse they are when they get out.”
The longer they stay, the more we spend on them, the worse they are when they get out. 
— Brian Moran, Virginia Secretary of Public Safety
Virginia is reinvesting savings from the reduction in the number of incarcerated youth and the closure of one of its large facilities 
into a wider array of alternative residential and nonresidential options located in communities around the state, enabling young 
people to be located closer to home and receive the kinds of assistance that will help them get back on track. The administration 
of Governor Terry McAuliffe has announced its intention to close the remaining two large institutions and continue the cycle of 
reinvesting those savings in expanded rehabilitative options.  
For those youth who are in custody, the state has adopted the Community Treatment Model (CTM), based on the Missouri 
approach. The model is being implemented one living unit at a time, and is expected to be operating statewide by the end of 
2016 to allow for the training, personnel, and policy changes needed to support the model. Key CTM features include revised 
visitation and phone call policies to promote family contact, and expansion of vocational and educational programs to help 
support youth development. 
Source: Martz, 2016.
youth prisons with much smaller, noncorrectional 
programs that focus on turning lives around. 
These are treatment-intensive, developmentally 
appropriate, secure programs that emphasize 
stronger youth-staff relationships, nurture family 
engagement, and build community connections. 
From the day youth walk in the door, the focus of 
these programs must be on helping them succeed 
when they return to the community. The best 
place for these facilities is close to youth’s home 
communities to facilitate maintaining family ties 
and gradual transitions into community-based 
programming.  
Such facilit ies rely on close and respectful 
relationships with adults who are actively engaged 
with youth throughout the day. To make this work, 
staff must be caring, highly motivated, extensively 
trained, and well supported by supervisors. 
Missouri, a pioneer of this approach, describes 
this as “eyes on, ears on, hearts on” care. High-
quality, rigorous programming throughout the day 
is essential, not just to keep young people engaged, 
but also to boost their educational, social, and 
emotional development.  
Suc c essf u l  model s l i ke M i ssou r i’s  have 
integrated several critical elements, including 
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a homelike and noncorrectional environment, 
programming, staffing inside the facility, and 
parent-family engagement bridging the facility 
and the community. An overall orientation 
toward helping youth get back on track means that 
treatment and developmental programming are 
trauma-informed; delivered by well-trained, well-
supervised, and well-supported staff; and address 
prosocial skill development, academic or vocational 
instruction, work readiness, and work experience. 
Positive youth development also implies that young 
people have leadership development experiences 
and opportunities to serve and give back to the 
community. One of the best opportunities for 
leadership development is to give youth a voice 
in their own treatment options and in informing 
general policy and practice.  
In the National Academies report referenced 
previously (Bonnie et al., 2013), the key tenets of the 
Missouri model are described as follows:
1. Continuous case management.
2. Decentralized residential facilities.
3. Small-group, peer-led services.
4. Restorative rehabilitation-centered treatment 
environment.
5. Strong organizational leadership.
6. Organizational culture change — a shift from 
providing services under the court and correctional 
systems to instead using the department of social 
services as the primary service provider. Culture 
Missouri — Replace
The state of Missouri won a 2008 Harvard Kennedy School Innovations in Government award (Ash Center for Democratic 
Governance and Innovation, 2016) for its long-standing juvenile justice reforms. Thirty years ago, decision-makers in Missouri 
made a statewide, systemwide shift in their approach. They closed down youth prisons and replaced them with smaller, more 
treatment-oriented programs in communities around the state so that they are located closer to youth’s families and communities 
(Mendel, 2010).
This multilayered treatment approach is designed to help youth make the behavioral changes that will get them back on track. 
This treatment approach is applied across programs and facilities, regardless of security or restrictiveness level, so that youth 
experience a consistent framework as they transition between settings. A core element of this systemwide approach is a 
rigorous group-treatment process, offering extensive and ongoing individualized attention. Another foundational element of 
the approach is the formation of strong, supportive peer and adult relationships that become the primary vehicle for compliance 
and security, rather than more coercive techniques.  
While cross-state recidivism comparisons are challenging, Missouri reports a recidivism rate of 31 percent; only 6.6 percent 
of youth return to the juvenile justice system and only 6.6 percent are committed to the adult prison system within three years 
(Missouri Division of Youth Services, 2010). The National Research Council found that the Missouri model contained many of 
the elements that research suggests should be available in model facilities, but that rigorous evaluation of Missouri’s approach 
had not yet been conducted (Bonnie et al., 2013). 
Sources: Mendel, 2010; Missouri Division of Youth Services, 2010.
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change also includes ensuring that staff are both 
highly qualified and highly trained. 
7. Highly effective treatment strategies and 
approaches and ensuring that the program 
consistently reflects on, improves on, and discards 
any ineffective initiatives.
8. Larger constituency and increased buy-in from 
stakeholders. 
To deliver such programming effectively, the physical 
plant must also reflect the commitment to youth 
development and success. The best place for this 
to occur is small units with normalized conditions 
Washington, D.C. — Reduce, Reform, Replace, Reinvest
For nearly three decades, Washington, D.C.’s juvenile justice agency had been the subject of scathing media critiques, fierce 
community advocacy, lengthy litigation, and successful reform efforts. In 1985, the American Civil Liberties Union and the 
District of Columbia Public Defender Service sued the district alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement at its three 
youth prisons, resulting in a consent decree in 1986 pursuant to Jerry M. v. District of Columbia. Despite the decree, conditions 
continued to deteriorate badly, resulting in more than a dozen remedial court orders, scathing reports by the district’s inspector 
general and a Blue Ribbon Commission and finally, in 2004, a motion to place the department into receivership.  
At that time, beatings of youth were common. The facility was badly overcrowded, with youth sleeping on plastic cots in common 
space meant for recreation. Youth reported that rats and cockroaches crawled on them while they were sleeping. Young people 
were left in their cells for so long that they often urinated or defecated in them. Youth who entered confinement drug-free tested 
positive for marijuana after 30 days (Schiraldi, 2015a). Solitary confinement and shackling were commonly used. The facility’s 
school was so bad that it was placed under court receivership for a time.
In 2001, the district’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Juvenile Justice Reform issued a report recommending the replacement of 
the lone remaining youth prison — the Oak Hill Youth Center — with a small, rehabilitative facility based on the Missouri model, 
coupled with a continuum of community-based programs for youth in lieu of confinement.1 In 2004, after years of activism 
by philanthropies and the Justice for DC Youth coalition, the Council of the District of Columbia passed the Omnibus Juvenile 
Justice Act, which included provisions to close Oak Hill and redirect resources to community-based programs. That year, to 
fulfill the mission laid out in the Blue Ribbon Commission report and the Omnibus bill, the council and the mayor also created 
a new, cabinet-level juvenile justice agency, the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS), hiring Vincent Schiraldi 
as its first director in 2005.  
Over the next 2.5 years, the population of more than 250 youth at Oak Hill was reduced, and Youth Link, a robust neighborhood-
based and community-driven continuum of community services, supports, and opportunities, was created. The department’s 
mission changed from a correctional approach to one based on the tenets of positive youth development, endeavoring to build 
on young people’s strengths rather than merely extinguishing their deficits. The department consulted with the architects of 
the Missouri model to help dramatically improve the culture of its secure facility. The facility’s failing school was replaced with 
the vibrant, nonprofit Maya Angelou School. 
In May 2009, DYRS replaced the notorious Oak Hill Youth Center with New Beginnings, a state-of-the-art, 60-bed facility (Ryan 
and Schindler, 2011). The lead plaintiff’s counsel in Jerry M., Alan Pemberton, stated “We have seen more progress toward 
compliance in the last two years than we saw in the previous 20 years” (Mendel, 2008). The department’s reforms were named 
a semifinalist in the prestigious Harvard Kennedy School Ash Center Innovations Awards (losing to the Missouri Division of 
Youth Services). As of June 29, 2016, there are only 26 youth confined in New Beginnings.
1 By 2001, Washington, D.C.’s other two facilities — Receiving Home for Children and Cedar Knoll — had already been closed, 
one by order of the district’s presiding judge and the other by an act of Congress.
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such as family-style meals, personal clothing or 
school uniforms, sleeping quarters that are more 
like bedrooms than cells, and homelike furnishings. 
Large, institutional-style prisons cannot be retrofitted 
to provide such an environment. Moreover, most 
youth prisons are located far from home, making 
it much more difficult to maintain family ties or 
facilitate gradual transitions into community-based 
programming, both of which are critical to long-term 
success. The only viable option is to replace large 
youth prisons with smaller, more home-like facilities 
close to youth’s communities. 
Reinvest
Implementing all three strategies simultaneously — 
reduce, reform, replace — makes a fourth “r” possible: 
reinvest. As systems start to shift their practice to keep 
more youth at home and to use more effective but less 
costly approaches to supervision and services, the 
dollars saved can be used to further expand the array 
of options available. The American public supports 
this kind of reinvestment. A recent poll by the Pew 
Charitable Trusts found that 79 percent of respondents 
strongly supported “diverting lower-level juvenile 
offenders from corrections facilities and investing 
the savings into probation and other alternatives” 
(Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014). Likewise, in a national 
poll commissioned by Youth First, 83 percent of 
respondents supported “provid[ing] financial 
incentives for states and municipalities to invest in 
alternatives to youth incarceration, such as intensive 
rehabilitation; rehabilitative programming such as 
education, job training, [and] community services; 
and programs that provide youth the opportunity 
to repair harm to victims and communities” (Youth 
First, 2016).
In addition to capturing the savings from reducing 
youth prisons for services, supports, and opportunities 
for youth in the community, systems already 
established to help them — including child welfare 
and mental health systems — need to step up when 
it comes to addressing the needs of delinquent youth. 
Ohio — Reduce, Reform, Reinvest
At its core, RECLAIM1 Ohio (Ohio Department of Youth Services, n.d.) has effectively changed the fiscal incentives of juvenile 
justice toward community-based innovation and away from youth corrections. Under RECLAIM, several policy and practice 
innovations have been implemented to reduce the number of youth sent to state-run youth prisons. RECLAIM began in the early 
1990s, a period when being tough on crime was the prevailing policy stance. Between 1992 and today, annual admissions to 
the Ohio Department of Youth Services declined by 80 percent, from 2,500 to 500. The core of RECLAIM is to shift funding of 
youth corrections from the state to counties using a population-based formula. As continuing experience with RECLAIM has 
identified areas where further adjustments were needed, new elements have been added to fine-tune and expand the program. 
For instance, the Behavioral Health and Juvenile Justice Initiative supports evidence-based community programs for youth who 
have mental health and/or substance abuse issues. Targeted RECLAIM delivers evidence-based programs in the community to 
youth with felony convictions, has reduced correctional facility admissions by 68 percent, and decreased the likelihood of youth 
being locked up in the future. The ongoing refinement of the program to continue to reduce youth in confinement anywhere in 
the state demonstrates the benefit of the state’s continued engagement, data collection, and oversight.    
1 RECLAIM stands for Reasonable and Equitable Community and Local Alternatives to the Incarceration of Minors.
Source: Juvenile Justice Coalition, 2015.
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There is also a need to assess the processes and 
outcomes of these alternative services. Many kids are 
sent into placement because the alternatives in the 
community do not seem up to the task and, far too 
often, programs resist serving youth who have more 
challenging and complex problems. Attention must 
be paid to ensuring that youth actually receive the 
services, supports, and opportunities they need and 
that those services work.
Wraparound Milwaukee was established in 1995 
to provide a system of care for children who were 
involved in Milwaukee’s mental health, child welfare, 
and youth justice systems with coordinated, cross-
system services in lieu of confinement or residential 
placement outside the home.
Since the creation of Wraparound, the average daily 
residential treatment population in Milwaukee 
has dropped by 71 percent, from 375 youth to 110 
youth, while the average length of stay in residential 
treatment has dropped from 14 months to four 
months (Kamradt, 2014). Research shows that the 
recidivism rate for youth enrolled in Wraparound 
Milwaukee remains both constant and low (Kamradt 
and Goldfarb, 2015). 
Conclusion
The leadership, commitment, and courage that are 
beginning to be seen in efforts taking place across 
the country and highlighted here are needed in 
every state to, at long last, close every youth prison 
and replace this failed, harmful approach with one 
that can help youth get back on track. Seldom in 
American policy are incentives and imperatives 
so closely aligned — youth development, fiscal 
prudence, and community safety would be far 
better served by closing every last youth prison and 
replacing these factories of failure with pathways to 
success for all youth. 
Endnotes
1.  We a re h a rd l y  a lone i n a n a log i z i ng 
euphemistically named juvenile facilities to 
prisons. In 1967, for example, Justice Hugo Black, 
writing a concurring opinion in In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967), wrote “It is, in all 
but name, a penitentiary.” In 1980, eminent 
correctional historian David Rothman wrote, “It 
was no easy matter to distinguish a training school 
from a prison” (Conscience and Convenience, Little 
Brown and Co., 1980). Writing for the minority in 
the 1984 case Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 104 S.Ct. 
2403, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote, “[F]airly 
viewed, pretrial detention of a juvenile gives rise 
to injuries comparable to those associated with the 
imprisonment of an adult.” In the petition filed in 
Schall v. Martin, New York City Deputy Mayor and 
co-founder of the Vera Institute of Justice Herbert 
Sturz stated more succinctly that the detention 
center was “in many ways, indistinguishable 
from a prison.” Although Marshall and Sturz 
were referring to a youth detention facility, their 
observations easily apply to training schools.
2. Statement at American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, 1995. Reported by United 
Press International and Newsday.
3. For a discussion of the special developmental 
needs of court-involved emerging adults older than 
age 18, see Schiraldi, Western, and Bradner (2015). 
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4. Roper v. Simmons (03-633) 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 112 
S.W.3d 397, affirmed, and Miller v. Alabama 132 S.Ct. 
2455 (2012).
5. This does not mean that, for short periods of 
time and through great effort, large facilities 
have been unable to be run in a manner that is 
less institutional and abusive than is described 
in this paper. Still, large, locked facilities for 
youth degenerate into destructive environments 
with sufficient regularity to warrant a call for the 
abolition of the youth prison model.
6. See, for example, Holman and Ziedenberg (2011). 
7. Schiraldi (2001) quotes DiIulio’s warning against 
a “rising tide of juvenile superpredators” who 
are “fatherless, godless, and without conscience,” 
further stating, “all that’s left of the black 
community in some pockets of urban America 
is deviant, delinquent and criminal adults 
surrounded by severely abused and neglected 
children, virtually all of whom were born out of 
wedlock.”
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